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NOTES
ARBITRARY EXCLUSION FROM MULTIPLE LISTING:
COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
Grillo v. Board of Realtors*
The Practice of Multiple Listing
Multiple listing is defined as "an arrangement among real estate board ...
members whereby each broker brings his listings to the attention of other
members so that if a sale results, the commission is divided between the ...
[listing broker and the selling broker], with a small percentage going to the
board."' To effectuate the arrangement, multiple listing agreements are obtained
with property owners, giving to all board members jointly the exclusive right
to sell the listed property. Once obtained, the agreement must be filed with
the board within a specified number of days. Information concerning the property
is then relayed to all members, after which any member may offer the property
to a prospective buyer.
(1) Benefits and Drawbacks. By exposing the listings of each member to the
sales efforts of every other member, multiple listing benefits both sellers and
buyers. Sellers have their property offered in a number of offices, thus reaching
a wider market in a shorter period of time, while buyers are provided with a
convenient means of selecting property to fit individual needs without having
to shop from office to office. Competition as well as efficiency can be enhanced
by multiple listing. "[0] ne of the most important functions of a MLS [multiple
listing system] is to provide the small real-estate office with a diversified inventory
of properties which will meet the needs of all but the most highly discriminating
buyers," thus providing "the small office with inventory and promotion potentials
equal to those of the larger firms .... ,,2
There are, on the other hand, certain disadvantages inherent in the practice.
As Adam Smith observed in 1776: "People of the same trade seldom meet to-
gether, even for merriment or diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices.".3 More recently, it
has been stated that: "A MLS performs best if it controls such a large proportion
of the potential market that all offices except the very large ones become
members."4 Thus, a goal of multiple listing systems is to strive for market
control in order to assure maximum performance. Once such domination is
established, however, a board can reap the spoils of its market control more
profitably by excluding any remaining nonmembers from participation. Excluded
brokers cannot compete successfully with members and could ultimately be
forced out of business, leaving the spectre of price-fixing by the board in their
wake.
(2) Scope of the Practice. In most instances the local board is a member
* 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. Div. 1966).
1 Unger, Real Estate Principles and Practices 434 (1959).2 Case, Real Estate Market Behavior in Los Angeles-A Study of Multiple Listing System
Data 49 (1963).
3 1 Smith, Wealth of Nations 170 (4th ed. 1789).
4 Case, supra note 2.
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of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB). The NAREB
has promulgated By-Laws and a Code of Ethics, both of which are theoretically
embraced within the rules of its member boards. These By-Laws include recom-
mendations for operating multiple listing services, the most significant of which
is contained in Article 1, section 2: "The Member Board shall not apply any
arbitrary numeric or other inequitable limitation on its members." 5 The Official
Interpretations by the NAREB Board of Directors dealing with this section,
while not mandatory, serve as useful guides toward understanding what are
deemed "inequitable limitations." The following have been described as areas
of inequitable limitation: mandatory participation in multiple listing, initiation
fees exceeding the recommended figure of three times annual dues, ineligibility
of branch offices for membership, mandatory commission fee schedules, and
period-in-business limitations on membership. 6
In addition to this recommended scheme of operation, rules are drawn up by
the individual boards for regulating their membership and the multiple listing
system. It thus becomes essential to determine whether the recommended stan-
dards enunciated by the NAREB are sufficient to safeguard against monopolistic
tendencies, whether they are met by the local boards in the practice of multiple
listing, and if not, whether the deviations are significant enough to render the
practice followed vulnerable to attack on restraint of trade or business tort
grounds.
Grillo v. Board of Realtors-Multiple Listing Practice Declared Illegal
Plaintiff, Rudolph Grillo, was a real estate broker licensed by the State of
New Jersey7 and operating his own brokerage business in Plainfield. Defendant
Board was a private association comprising the great majority of active real
estate brokers and salesmen in Plainfield and the surrounding area and was a
member of the NAREB. The rules of defendant Board prohibited the sale of
multiple-listed property by nonmembers and seriously hampered any coopera-
tion between "Realtors" 8 and nonmembers.9 During the eight-year period from
1958 to 1966, Grillo, prompted by a desire to share in the economic advantages of
its multiple listing system, unsuccessfully sought membership in defendant
Board on four different occasions. Following these futile efforts, he brought suit
alleging that the defendant Board constituted an unlawful combination in
5 The By-Laws also provide that each member board shall adopt the Code of Ethics of
the NAREB as a part of its rules and regulations. See United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 494 (1950).
6 Letter from Harold Klingerman, national representative of the NAREB, to President
Lavenhar of the Plainfield Area Board of Realtors, cited in Brief and Summation for Plaintiff,
p. 13, Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. 1966).
7 NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:15-9, 45:15-10 (1963, Supp. 1966) provides for such licensing.
8 "The term 'Realtor' was . . . presented to and adopted by the NAREB in 1916. The
term is owned and controlled by NAREB.... [Alnyone not duly authorized by the NAREB
is not entitled to designate himself a Realtor in any manner." Unger, supra note 1, at 16.
9 Although a nonmember could refer his prospective buyers to members and, in the event
a sale was consummated, receive 30% of the net commission received by the selling Realtor,
this was not a particularly favorable concession. Under the rules of defendant Board, com-
missions on the sale or rental of multiple listings were divided as follows: listing Realtor
20%, selling Realtor 75%, and listing service 5%. A nonmember referring a prospect to a
member could thus receive only 22.5% of the commission realized from his prospect. A
member, on the other hand, could make the sale to his own prospect and receive the full
75% selling-broker share.
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restraint of trade. He did not demand a judgment compelling his admission to
the Board, but rather sought compensatory and punitive damages and an
injunction against continuation of the multiple listing system as practiced.
The New Jersey Superior Court held that the combined activity of defendants,
causing harm to plaintiff, was an unreasonable and illegal restraint upon trade
in violation of the common law. Alternatively, defendants' concerted refusal to
allow plaintiff to participate in benefits of multiple listing was held to be tortious.
Defendants were held jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for $9,000 damages
for probable lost sales commissions, and operation of the multiple listing system
in its existing form was enjoined. It was ordered that, before resumption of the
operation, defendant Board was to modify its rules to enable nonmembers to
participate in multiple listing. Specifically, the court directed (1) that listing
information be made available to nonmembers on the same basis as members;
(2) that both members and nonmembers comply with Board regulations which
required that all property listings, with specified exceptions, be multiple listed;
(3) that listings secured by nonmembers be distributed on the same basis as
those obtained by members; and (4) that the listing service receive a percentage
of the commission whether sale of listed property is consummated by a member
or nonmember.'
Court Recognition of a Nonmember's Claim: Overcoming Jurisdictional Problems
(1) Doctrines of Exclusive and Primary Jurisdiction. In effect, the real-estate
brokerage business is a regulated industry, subject to statutory licensing provi-
sions and administrative agency control in most states." The jurisdiction of
such an administrative agency is exclusive when the remedy which it is em-
powered to grant is the only relief available in a given situation. 12 The argument
may be made, as it was by the defendant in Grillo, that the state real-estate
commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of claims by non-
member brokers against other brokers operating a multiple listing system. The
defendant in Grillo argued that the legislature, in enacting statutory licensing
controls, had indicated that the real estate brokerage business can best serve the
public interest if not permitted to operate in a freely competitive market. Further,
defendant argued that the licensing statute, in derogation of all common-law
restraint of trade principles, indicated a legislative choice not to permit the
brokerage business to be controlled by case law. The New Jersey court rejected
this contention, finding no legislative intent to displace common-law actions.
It stressed the fact that plaintiff had "two avenues available to him: one by
complaint.., in the administrative forum under the statute,' 3 and the other in
the court under the common law."'"
Realizing that, by its acknowledgment that plaintiff had two avenues available,
it had invited an argument for application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
1o Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 229, 219 A.2d 635, 650 (Ch. Div. 1966).
11 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 10000-11709 (West 1962); Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 451.201-451.219 (1948); N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 440-442 (McKinney 1945).
12 GriUo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 10, at 212, 219 A.2d at 640.
13 The court noted the concluding language of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:15-17 (1963): "The
commission is expressly vested with the power and authority to make, prescribe and enforce
any and all rules and regulations for the conduct of the real estate brokerage business con-
sistent with the provisions of the act."
14 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 10, at 212, 219 A.2d at 640.
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the court quickly rejected that doctrine's applicability as well. As explained in
Marnell v. United Parcel Service,15 "the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
mainly intended to apply to cases in which the Court has jurisdiction to grant
a remedy.. . but the issues are such as also fall within the special competence-
the 'expertise'--of an administrative agency in some field wherein uniformity of
statute policy or interpretation is desirable.""' The court in Grillo based its
rejection of the doctrine on two grounds. First, it noted that the language of
the New Jersey statute which defined the Real Estate Commission's power'7
"cannot be construed as a grant of power to inquire into and make decisions
concerning legal liability of licensees .... ,'18 The logic of this ground for
rejection of the primary jurisdiction argument is more clearly presented in
the Marnell case, where the district court pointed out that, because the adminis-
trative agency could not determine the legal liability of defendant, it lacked
any concern with the issue presented by the action. Any determination, it
reasoned, "would be made, not in the light of the antitrust laws, but only in
light of the . . . policies declared by the regulatory acts . ... ,19 Second, the
Grillo court concluded that the purposes of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
would not be promoted by dismissing on that ground, because the questions
presented were not ones requiring the expertise of the commission.2 0
As appears from the above, the common-law rights sought to be enforced in a
state court action against brokers operating a multiple listing system are not
properly subject to either the exclusive or primary jurisdiction of the state real-
estate commission. It is equally clear from Marnell that, in an action under the
federal antitrust laws, a contention for exclusive or primary jurisdiction in the
real-estate commission must faiL21 It thus seems that there should be little
difficulty in establishing jurisdiction despite the regulated industry factor. One
qualification might be added, however. In an action based on common-law
restraint of trade, a court might consider the real-estate commission's evalua-
tion of multiple listing helpful even though made in light of policies emanating
from the regulatory act. This follows from the fact that common-law restraint
principles are said to emphasize public harm,22 a proper concern of the real-
estate commission.
(2) Justiciability. Assuming the court finds that it has jurisdiction and that
the primary jurisdiction doctrine is inapplicable, the problem of justiciability
may still confront a nonmember asserting a cause of action against an association
'r 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1 71,913 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1966).
18 Id. at 83,210.
17 See note 13 supra.
18 Grilo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 212, 219 A.2d 635, 641 (Ch. Div. 1966).
10 Marnell v. United Parcel Service, supra note 15, at 83,210.
20 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 18, at 212-13, 219 A.2d at 641. This ground
would appear questionable unless intended in the sense that, as urged in Marnell, the com-
mission's concern with the defendants' business practices was only in terms of the "public"
interest as declared in the regulatory act, and therefore any "expertise" would be misapplied.
If, on the other hand, the commission did have concern for the "private" rights of the
parties, as hypothesized by the court in Grillo, it could be strongly argued that its evaluation
of the multiple listing system should be obtained.
21 Marnell v. United Parcel Service, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff 71,913, at 83,204-07,
83,209-11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1966).
22 See Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 18, at 225, 219 A.2d at 648. See also text
accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
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of licensees practicing multiple listing. There is a recognized hesitancy on the
part of courts to interfere with the internal affairs of private associations.23
Generally, the granting of membership in a private, voluntary association wil
not be judicially compelled regardless of how arbitrary or unjust the rejection
might have been.24 Recent decisions such as the New Jersey case of Falcone v.
Middlesex County Medical Soc'y 2 5 have, however, established a major exception
to this general rule.26
In Falcone, an action in lieu of mandamus was brought by a licensed physician
excluded from defendant medical society and thus precluded from using hospital
facilities. A decree compelling admission was affirmed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, on the ground that the society assumed the nature of an involun-
tary association because membership was an "economic necessity."2 7 The Grillo
court, while noting that the Falcone case similarly involved the right of a private
association to exclude a licensed individual from membership, thus restricting
his privilege of practicing a profession, distinguished the justiciability questions
presented on the ground that compelled admission was sought in Falcone rather
than injunctive relief and damages as in the instant case.
Nevertheless, the injunction issued in Grillo amounted to a mandate that the
Board either allow plaintiff to participate in multiple listing or discontinue the
system altogether. In effect, the court decreed that plaintiff be raised to the
status of a member, thus undermining the distinction drawn between the instant
suit and one demanding compelled admission. The court in Grillo, therefore,
should not have ignored the justiciability issue simply because the plaintiff
had not sought admission. Rather, it should have made clear that this case fell
within the exception outlined in Falcone, and hence that judicial cognizance was
proper, despite the variance in relief demanded.
Theories of Recovery
A nonmember harmed by exclusion from a multiple listing arrangement might
base his action upon common-law restraint of trade, or he might bring it under
the Sherman Act or a state antimonopoly statute. The legal principles involved
23 Medical Soc'y of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944);
Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 253-54, 293 P.2d
862, 869 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (1881). See generally
Annot., 137 A.L.R. 311 (1942); Developments in the Law, "Judicial Control of Actions of
Private Associations," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1963); Comment, 52 Cornell L.Q. 104, 109-15
(1966).
24 E.g., Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 301, 46
Cal. Rptr. 808, 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966); Gold Knob
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 964, 966-68, 971-74 (1963).
25 34 NJ. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
26 See also James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944);
Kurk v. Medical Soc'y of County of Queens, 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County), rev'd on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't
1965). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 993-94, 1040.
27 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 592, 170 A.2d 791, 796-97
(1961). Various formulations of this "economic necessity" notion may be found, but
most often emphasis is placed upon the existence of a virtual monopoly over some source
of supply or over the use of some facility, thereby giving rise to corresponding obligations
in regard to membership selection; see, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., supra note 26, at
731-32, 155 P.2d at 335; Kurk v. Medical Soc'y of County of Queens, supra note 26, at
798, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
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in all three are similar, since the federal and many of the state antitrust statutes
have been held to incorporate the common law on restraints of trade.28 Alterna-
tively, the nonmember may choose to bring his action in tort, the possible
theories being interference with prospective advantage, concerted refusal to
deal, and prima fade tort. The choice of a particular theory requires considera-
tion both of its adaptability to an action for relief against exclusion from
multiple listing and of the problems inherent in its use.
(1) Common-Law Restraint of Trade. Common-law restraint of trade should
offer a suitable theory in most jurisdictions. "Restraint of trade" embraces "acts,
contracts, agreements or combinations which operate to the prejudice of the
public interests by unduly restricting competition .... ,,29 While "every agree-
ment concerning trade ... restrains,"30 it is only the unreasonable combination
in restraint of trade that is unlawful. 3' Moreover, under some circumstances a
combination in restraint of trade may be justified and therefore legal.32
As in Grillo, the threshold question is whether a nonmember can assert a
cause of action for affirmative relief under common-law restraint principles.
Traditionally, courts applying these principles did not grant affirmative relief to
private parties injured by the prohibited practices, but merely refused to enforce
all contracts involved as against public policy 38 Emphasis thus came to be laid
upon a showing of public harm, with one court holding that a suit brought by the
attorney general "on behalf of the state in the interest of the public" would not
be barred by the traditional rule of "mere unenforceability." 34 Grillo rejected
these common-law limitations on the availability of affirmative relief. Relying on
Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical SoC'y,35 the court found that under
modern common-law restraint of trade principles, injured third-party competi-
tors may be afforded affirmative relief upon a showing of public harm accom-
panied by only "slight additional private interest as justification for seeking the
remedial services of the court."3 6 No specific finding of harm to the public was
28 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (holding that Sherman Act incorporates common law
of restraints of trade); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 638, 237
P.2d 737, 763 (1951) (holding that state constitutional provision encompasses common law
of restraints of trade).
29 Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 168 Wis. 400, 405, 170 N.W. 230,
232 (1919).
30 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
31 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
32 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 223, 219 A.2d 635, 647 (Ch. Div. 1966),
citing Board of Trade v. United States, supra note 30.
33 Downes v. Bennett, 63 Kan. 653, 66 Pac. 623 (1901); Park & Sons Co. v. National
Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903) (dictum); Macauley Bros. v.
Tierney, 19 RJ. 255, 33 AUt. 1 (1895) ; Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D.
598 (Ct. App. 1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25 (1891) (dictum).
34 McCarter v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 74 NJ. Eq. 372, 387-88, 73 At. 80, 86 (1909).
35 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). The court in Group Health pointed out that
the rule of "mere unenforceability" originated when contracts in restraint of trade were
characterized by agreements between parties, relinquishing rights to carry on trade, and was
probably merely an application of the doctrine of pari delicto. Now that concepts of restraint
of trade encompass combinations to restrain competition to the detriment of third parties,
the basis for the rule no longer justifies its application. Id. at 654-55, 237 P.2d at 773-74.
36 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 32, at 215-16, 219 A.2d at 643, citing Terwilliger
v. Graceland Memorial Park Ass'n, 35 NJ. 259, 268, 173 A.2d 33, 38 (1961).
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made; rather, the injury to plaintiff was equated with public harm by reason of
the diminution of competition.3 7 Plaintiff's status as a competitor was deemed
sufficient private interest to establish standing to sue.
It is apparent that under this conception of common-law restraint principles,
emphasis on public, as distinguished from private, harm is illusory, and common-
law restraint of trade is therefore a serviceable theory for injured competitors.
Nevertheless, though the weight of authority today seemingly favors affirmative
relief,38 some jurisdictions continue to adhere to the view that business restraints
are merely unenforceable3 9 and do not recognize a right of action in third-party
competitors under a common-law restraint theory.40
Although the requirement of specific harm to the public has been de-emphasized
to the extent that most courts do not look for it in determining whether a cause
of action exists,41 the subsequent decision on the merits still rests largely on con-
siderations of public harm. The element of public harm is there reinserted in
terms of "unreasonableness," since the common-law theory condemns only that
conduct which constitutes an unreasonable restraint. In Grillo, as elsewhere, 42
resort was had to federal antitrust experience under the Sherman Act 43 in deter-
mining the question of unreasonableness. Though the court drew an analogy
between the case at bar and federal court cases holding concerted refusals to deal
to be unreasonable per se,44 it chose not to utilize the conclusive presumption of
illegality but to determine the reasonableness of defendants' conduct for itself.
The determination which ensued, however, may have been inadequately sup-
ported. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,45 the United States Supreme
Court noted that "whether ... [a] restraint is reasonable or not must be judged
in part at least in the light of its effect on competition . . . . 46 United States v.
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. 47 indicated that competitors must be foreclosed from a
substantial market or part of a market in order for there to be restraint under
the Sherman Act. 48 If such a substantial impact on competition must be shown,
37 "[D]efendant Board's method of conducting its multiple listing service tends to stifle
... competition. I find also that plaintiff has suffered diminution of profits ... as a result
of the restraints thus imposed .... " Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 32, at 223,
219 A.2d at 647.
38 See 36 Am. Jur. "Monopolies" §§ 204, 214 (1941).
39 See Annot., 92 A.L.R. 185 (1934).
40 If such courts were to grant affirmative relief, the public harm element, as in Grillo,
would probably be satisfied by equating injury to a competitor with public harm in the
form of decreased competition.
41 The Sherman Act, like Grillo, seems to equate harm to a competitor with public harm
in giving a cause of action for treble damages to third-party competitors; see note 60 infra.
42 The Washington Supreme Court in Group Health had utilized federal antitrust experi-
ence as well; see Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash.2d 586,
237 P.2d 737 (1951).
48 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
44 E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (information available
by direct wire service); Kor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(appliances).
45 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
46 Id. at 397.
47 105 F. Supp. 670 (ElD. La. 1952).
48 Id. at 679. The court reasoned that "for the restraint to be unreasonable it is not
necessary that it eliminate all or substantially all competition. If this were not true, only
total monopolization would be unlawful under the Act.' Ibid. Yet the court based its hold-
ing of illegality on a finding that competition in a substantial part of the market was
restrained.
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it would seem to necessitate the determination of a relevant geographic market49
in order that the effect on competition therein may be realistically appraised. 50
Consequently, although the Grillo court apparently reached the right conclusion
by using a standard based upon a "tendency toward preventing competition," 5'
this standard seems too vague for practical application absent an accompanying
determination of the relevant market.52 Since the court obviously disliked blanket
application of the presumption of illegality attached to concerted refusals to deal
by federal courts applying federal antitrust laws, it seems inconsistent that its
own determination of unreasonableness did not include a finding of a relevant
geographical market by which attention might have been focused on the particu-
lar fact situation.
Although the defense of justification has some applicability under common-law
restraint principles, the court in Grillo rejected defendants' contention that its
practices were justified as an attempt to protect the public from unethical or
incompetent brokerage services. The court found that, in view of the compre-
hensive scheme of regulation, defendants were "proceeding as an extra-govern-
mental body in a pre-empted field." 5  In states without such comprehensive
regulation, a legitimate ethical motivation, as opposed to one strictly commercial
in nature,54 might serve to justify the imposition of some standards restricting
49 "Relevant market" is the term most used to indicate the geographic market and product
line affected by an alleged violation of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964). United States v. EJ. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593 (1957).
The product market defines the relevant market in terms of cross-elasticity of the demand
for products. The geographic market defines the relevant market in terms of the cross-
elasticity of the supply of products. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271, 283 (1964) (dissenting opinion); see Note, 52 Cornell L.Q. 600, 600 nn.2-6 and
accompanying text (1967). A relevant market determination has also been held to be a
predicate to liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570 (1966), and has been defined under that provision in much the same way as
for Clayton Act purposes. Id. at 573.
6o In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 671 (D. Del. 1947), the district
court recognized that such a relevant market determination was essential to a finding of
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act. At the same time, it was intimated that,
though the standards of unreasonableness under § 1 of the act are less strict, some deter-
mination of a relevant geographic market should be made there also. Id. at 673.
5' Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 218, 219 A.2d 635, 644 (Ch. Div. 1966).
52 The defendant in GriUo contested the determination of unreasonableness made with-
out a prior finding of a relevant market. It argued that the Board's territory did not neces-
sarily constitute a relevant market because the commodity involved, being immovable, had
a value largely dependent upon its location. A listing within the Board's territory might have
little attraction to the public while a comparable listing outside the territory of the Board
might have a great attraction. Many of the Realtors testified that a substantial portion of
their listings and sales were outside the geographical confines of the Plainfield Board, pre-
sumably in areas serviced by other multiple listing systems. Therefore, defendants argued,
since the Realtors have a larger geographic market, so too does plaintiff. And in those areas,
outside the Plainfield Board's jurisdiction, he could not profess restraint of trade by them.
Brief and Summation for Defendant, pp. 23-24, Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 51.
63 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 51, at 225, 219 A.2d at 648; see Mogelefsky v.
Schoem, 90 N.J. Super. 49, 59, 216 A.2d 236, 241 (App. Div. 1966); State v. Stockl, 85 N.J.
Super. 591, 599, 205 A.2d 478, 483 (Law Div. 1964).
54 The court in Grillo no doubt laid great stress on the arbitrary restrictions found to
have been imposed on membership by defendant Board. A prohibitive initiation fee of
$1,000 was cited as offering "a strong inference that the amount . . . [had] been set as a
barrier against applications which could otherwise be filed." Grillo v. Board of Realtors,
supra note 51, at 211, 219 A.2d at 640. Moreover, the period-in-business limitation on
membership was viewed by the court as a hurdle "placed... in the way of newcomers." Ibid.
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membership and participation in multiple listing. Nevertheless, the use of the
defense of justification in this area has obvious limitations. As was pointed out in
Sugar Institute v. United States:55
The endeavor to put a stop to illicit practices must not itself become illicit.
As the statute draws the line at unreasonable restraints, a coiperative
endeavor which transgresses that line cannot justify itself by pointing to
evils afflicting the industry or to a laudable purpose to remove them.
56
It becomes apparent that the so-called "defense" of justification is actually
directed at the element of unreasonableness and has ceased to constitute a
separate defense. Thus certain forms of cooperative action may produce justifiable
results,57 but once an unreasonable restraint is found despite possible justifying
conditions, there is no "defense" of justification available.58
(2) Federal Antitrust Statutes. Of major concern to nonmembers seeking
relief against exclusion from multiple listing arrangements is the question whether
an action would lie under the Sherman Act,59 thus entitling a successful plaintiff
to treble damages.60 In expressly providing that the word "person" shall be
deemed to include associations existing under the laws of any state,6 1 the act
clearly established the amenability of private associations, such as local realtor
boards, to suits thereunder. 62 It might, therefore, be available in situations such
as that presented in Grillo.
The Sherman Act, like common-law restraint, prohibits only unreasonable
restraints of trade or competition. But it goes beyond common-law restraint in
calling for both a stricter definition of "trade" and the involvement of interstate
commerce. Sherman Act precedents classify certain activities in combination as
"illegal per se," without inquiry into the harm they cause or the business excuse
for their use.63 A concerted refusal to deal, the theory used in Grillo to find
common-law liability, is within this category,6 4 thus obviating the need for a
separate determination of unreasonableness. 65 But, the Sherman Act prerequisites
of finding the practice to be a "trade" and of showing the involvement of inter-
state commerce remain. The former should be satisfied by reference to United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards,66 in which it was held that real-
estate brokers and salesmen are not exempted by Section 6 of the Clayton Act 67
5r 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
56 Id. at 599.
57 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373-74 (1933); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925). Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
58 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). This
opinion contains an exhaustive review of the cases dealing with common-law restraint of
trade.
59 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
60 Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
61 Sherman Act § 8, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Package Stores Ass'n, 205 F. Supp. 789 (D. Conn.
1962); United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 30 F.2d 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1928).
63 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
64 See cases cited in note 44 supra.
65 Ibid.
66 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
67 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
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(providing that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce) from the meaning of the word "trade" in the Sherman Act.68
The second requirement-involvement of interstate commerce-poses the
greatest problem facing a nonmember relying on the Sherman Act. No direct
decision has been rendered on the question of whether real-estate brokerage
services can constitute interstate commerce. 69 The Supreme Court was not pre-
sented with this question in the Real Estate Boards case, since it involved
activities in the District of Columbia." °
The word "commerce" was originally construed to relate to a flow of goods or
commodities.71 The concept was later broadened to include, as Mr. Justice Black
concluded in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,72 "transactions
... though non-commercial; . . . though illegal and sporadic, and though they
do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of anything more tangible
than electrons and information." 73 While it is clear that, in the instant case, the
property listed cannot constitute any sort of flow of goods, it is actually the
brokerage services and information essential to those services which are being
restrained. It would logically seem to follow from the Supreme Court's holdings
that "services" constitute trade,74 that, if those services affect interstate com-
merce, the property to which the services relate need not also flow among the
states in order for interstate commerce to be involved.7 5 The fact that informa-
tion vital to the services here being restrained flows among the states should be
sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement. In Associated Press v.
United States,76 the requirement of interstate commerce was satisfied by the
interstate dissemination of news,77 an item equated with listings by the court in
Grillo.78 If it could be shown that listings were accepted on properties outside the
state and used by buyers within the board's own state, or that listings on property
within the board's state were used by out-of-state buyers, an analogy to the
dissemination in the Associated Press case could be drawn to establish inter-
state commerce.
68 United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950).
69 In United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 80 F. Supp. 350, 351 (D.D.C.
1948), there was dictum to the effect that agreements relating to charges in transactions in
real estate do not impose restraints upon interstate commerce since the charges do not directly
affect the sale of real estate itself. This dictum may lend itself to the argument that, where
restraint of competition for sales is complained of, this does relate to real-estate transactions,
and such transactions do constitute interstate commerce.
70 Section 3 of the Sherman Act, applicable to the District of Columbia, does not require
that interstate commerce be involved for a violation to exist since Congress has plenary
power of supervision in the District.71 Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168, 183 (1868).
72 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
73 Id. at 549-50.
74 E.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897).
75 Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) and Anderson v. United States, 171
U.S. 604 (1898) do not dictate otherwise. Both cases involved situations in which goods to
which commission services related did move across state lines, but the services were performed
wholly within one state, thus negativing the involvement of interstate commerce. Here it
may be possible to show that the services, or information and funds directly related to the
services, do "cross" states lines though the related property does not.
76 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
77 Id. at 14.
78 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 NJ. Super. 202, 222, 219 A.2d 635, 646 (Ch. Div. 1966).
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If, as posited, buyers from other states came into the board's territory to
purchase property and made use of multiple listing, interstate commerce might
arguably exist on the same basis as was used by Congress in Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to define restaurants covered by the act.7 9 While the meaning
ascribed to "interstate commerce" by Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act
cannot be used to determine the intent of Congress in passing the Sherman Act,80
Katzenbach v. McClung,81 in which the validity of part of the Civil Rights Act
was established, shows that the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of the
commerce power to reach restaurants which serve interstate travelers or which
serve, in large part, food which has moved in interstate commerce.8 2 An analogy
could thus be made that multiple-listed property sold to out-of-state buyers, like
food sold to interstate travelers, is encompassed within the regulatory power of
Congress under the commerce clause. Two facts weaken the analogy, however.
First, it must be remembered that in Title II Congress.was using the commerce
power for civil rights purposes, and it cannot be conclusively presumed that the
scope of that power, though verbally defined in each instance in terms of "affect-
ing interstate commerce," will be held to be as broad when used for restraint of
trade purposes. Second, in Title II Congress created a category within which
restaurants are conclusively presumed to affect interstate commerce. 83 It may be
more difficult to argue on a case-by-case basis that interstate commerce is
affected where out-of-state buyers make use of multiple listing. The first-men-
tioned weakness may prove fictitious when viewed in light of the ease with which
interstate commerce has been found to be involved in past Sherman Act cases. 84
These decisions indicate that, in the Sherman Act, the commerce power has been
utilized to its fullest potential.85 Hence, the use of the commerce power for
Sherman Act purposes must necessarily be at least as broad as its use in any
other context, such as civil rights. In sum, interstate commerce should be able to
be shown in multiple listing sales and the Sherman Act should be available in
suits against local real-estate boards.86
79 78 Stat. 243 (1964) 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2) (1964).
80 One situation in which the Supreme Court has given two separate statutes an "inter-
laced" reading was presented in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). There,
however, the Court was determining congressional policy with regard to labor and the
antitrust laws.
81 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Insofar as Katzenbach v. McClung upholds the validity of
§ 201 (c) (2), of Title II of the Civil Rights Act, bringing restaurants which serve interstate
travelers within the category required to refrain from discriminatory practices, it represents
a Supreme Court holding on the scope of the commerce power which is likely to be followed.
See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).82 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
83 Id. at 302-03.
84 See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See
also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).85 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, supra note 84, in which the
Supreme Court, in determining whether the Sherman Act was applicable to the insurance
industry, reasoned that "the real answer . .. is to be found in the Commerce Clause itself
and in some of the great cases which interpret it." Id. at 549. The Court went on to con-
clude that Congress, vested with the commerce power, "available to be exercised for the
national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary," had no intention of excluding insurance
when it passed the Sherman Act in 1890. Id. at 552-53. The implication then would seem
to be that Congress intended to utilize its full commerce power in the Sherman Act.86 In the Grillo situation, the argument showing interstate commerce would have been
much stronger had the defendant Board not exempted commercial properties from those
which "must" be multiple listed, since sales of such properties would be more likely to
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(3) State Antitrust Statutes. State antimonopoly laws or constitutional pro-
visions may provide an additional vehicle for seeking relief against detrimental
exclusion from multiple listing and would be extremely important if interstate
commerce could not be shown. The Washington Supreme Court case of Group
Health Co-op. v. King County Medical SoC'y,87 cited in Grillo as general
authority for allowing affirmative relief in a suit based on common-law principles
of restraint of trade, was actually brought under a constitutional antimonopoly
provision."8 The provision was construed to incorporate common-law restraint,
and strong reasons were set forth for eliminating the common-law restrictions on
availability of affirmative relief under this theory.89
With special regard to the justiciability problem involved in suits against
private associations such as realtor boards, it should be observed that, though
Group Health offers a sound solution to problems in this branch of the law,90
some states do not have antimonopoly laws. Neither can it be assumed that all
states would construe existing statutes as including all of the common law of
restraints of trade, as did the Washington court in Group Health. Moreover, even
under such a broad construction, there is no assurance that the statute will apply
to the real-estate business and multiple listing. Certain of the laws are expressly
self-limiting, such as the New Jersey antitrust provision which affects solely
corporate mergers and acquisitions. 91 Others have been judicially construed as not
applying to the real-estate business. 92
(4) Tort of Interference With Prospective Advantage. This tort theory devel-
oped from actions forbidding the use or threat of physical violence as a means of
interfering with another's trade.98 As the law grew in economic sophistication and
emphasis shifted to concern for the fair and efficient operation of the competitive
system, interference with prospective advantage came to include not only the use
of violence but also the misuse of such ordinary techniques of competition as
unilateral refusals to deal.94 Even then, this tort was generally applied only
where there had been interference with a particular transaction, making possible
a showing of actual loss.
The interference represented by the exclusion of a broker from participation in
multiple listing and the refusal to furnish him with information concerning listed
properties is thus one step removed from the usual subject matter of the tort. In
an exclusion case, only potential sales have been lost as a result of the members'
action, and only probable losses can be shown. Although the court in Grillo relied
involve significant interstate contacts; see note 110 infra. Yet a large number of commercial
properties may still have been multiple listed, since members had discretion to choose to
list commercial properties with the Board.
87 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
88 Wash. Const. art. XII, § 22.
89 See note 35 supra.
90 Group Health first employed injunctive relief and damages to remedy the harm result-
ing from exclusion from a private association, conduct held to constitute a restraint of trade
violation.
91 NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14:3-10 (1939).
9.2 See, e.g., Nasman v. Bank of New York, 49 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1944), construing N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 as not applying to realty (purchase and
sale). By implication, brokerage services related to the purchase and sale of realty would
also be excluded from the purview of this antimonopoly section.
93 Developments in the Law, "Competitive Torts," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 890 (1964);
see, e.g., Garret v. Taylor, 18 Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1621).
9)4 Ibid.; see, e.g., Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904).
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on authority establishing the right to be protected from unjustified interference
with a particular transaction,95 it indicated in no uncertain terms that an exten-
sion of the tort of interference with prospective advantage to cover exclusion
from multiple listing was proper. Hence, potential economic advantage from
relations which would probably arise was held equally deserving of protection.
While the court based its reasoning in part on the characterization of defendants'
conduct as a concerted refusal to deal, 6 the basic test set forth for determining
unjustified interference is also applicable to the theory of interference with
prospective advantage. The test employed the inquiry "whether the conduct was
'both injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of common
morality or of law.' ",97 Defendants' refusal to allow nonmember participation in
multiple listing was held to fall outside the "rules of the game."9 8 Such unjustified
interference would be similarly condemned under the theory of interference with
prospective advantage.
(5) Tort of Concerted Refusal To Deal. The Grillo court's characterization of
defendants' conduct in refusing to allow plaintiff to participate in multiple listing
brought into play the tort of concerted refusal to deal.99 Under this theory,
plaintiff must prove that the conspiracy has an unlawful purpose or that the
participants use unlawful means.100 These elements could be demonstrated by
defendants' purpose to benefit themselves at plaintiff's expense by means of con-
certed action, "a presumptively ... suspect form of conduct . . . ."101 A commit-
ment by members not to furnish information concerning listed properties to
nonmembers fits readily into the framework of a concerted refusal. It has been
observed, however, that a "full analysis of a concerted refusal to deal usually
requires consideration of the likelihood of public as well as private injury," and
"reference to the public's economic interest helps to resolve the conflict between
the plaintiff's and defendants' private interests."10 2 This may represent a factor
detracting from the appeal of the concerted refusal to deal theory as an alterna-
tive to an action under common-law restraint of trade principles, since emphasis
would not be significantly shifted away from any requirement of public harm
remaining in the latter theory.103
(6) Prima Facie Tort. The principle of the prima facie tort is basically that
"prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action,
which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading,
95 Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 4 N.J. 169, 180, 72 A.2d 197, 203 (1950); Louis Kamm,
Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 586, 175 AtI. 62, 66, (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).96 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 225-26, 219 A.2d 635, 648 (Ch. Div.
1966).
97 Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 144, 137 A.2d 54, 60 (App. Div. 1957).
98 The "rules of the game" formulation was taken from 1 Harper & James, Torts, § 6.11,
at 510 (1956).
9 See generally Fort Wayne Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n v. Price, 127 Ind. App. 13, 137
N.E.2d 738 (1956); Purofied Down Prods. Corp. v. National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs., 201
Misc. 149, 105 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951); Restatement, Torts § 765, at
42 (1939).
100 Harding v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 327, 41 N.W.2d 818, 824 (1950).
101 Developments in the Law, supra note 93, at 929. However phrased, the question of
liability here, as under the prima facie tort theory, centers on whether defendant's conduct
was justified, thus adding little to the latter doctrine (see text accompanying note 104 infra).
Even where the prima fade tort has been accepted, however, concerted refusal principles
remain useful in emphasizing the presumptive illegality of concerted refusals. Ibid.
102 Id. at 930.
103 See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra.
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requires a justification if the defendant is to escape."' 0 4 The doctrine has re-
ceived varied reception among courts and writers, and the conflict as to its use-
fulness continues. 05
As with the unlawful purpose necessary under concerted refusal to deal con-
cepts, the requisite intent could be satisfied by defendants' purpose to benefit
themselves at the expense of plaintiff.10 6 Grillo was a case of first impression in
New Jersey, and future actions by nonmembers will similarly present novel
claims in other jurisdictions. For this reason, the prima fade tort doctrine, offer-
ing a useful approach to the solution of new problems, might prove appealing to
the courts. By bringing to the surface the competing interests involved, the
doctrine suggests as an analytical technique a "balancing of the importance,
social and private, of the objective advanced by the interference against the
importance of the interest interfered with .... -107 It has also been noted that
the doctrine of prima facie tort "seems particularly useful in dealing with cases
involving injury by the act of a private association since such groups frequently
possess power to injure individuals through conduct not encompassed within
conventional concepts.' 08 This would appear to be precisely the approach
necessary to an evaluation of the "temporal damage" resulting from the exclusion
of nonmembers from participation in multiple listing. The prima facie tort doc-
trine, in its capacity of supplementing the traditional torts, would be of particular
value in those jurisdictions which have not sufficiently developed the area of
competitive tort law to provide a suitable theory upon which an excluded broker
could bring suit.
Remedies
(1) Injunction. The injunctive relief fashioned by the court in Grillo appears
to provide an effective remedy in an action for exclusion by a nonmember.
Because multiple listing can perform a valuable service to the public, it is
desirable to allow its continuance once the harm to plaintiff and others similarly
situated has been eliminated. The injunction issued in Grillo, requiring changes
in the practices of the listing service, represents an attempt to effectuate that
goal. Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of the proposed changes reveals some short-
comings which a future court may want to correct. One apparent inadequacy is in
the provision for the continuance of mandatory participation in multiple listing
in order to secure any advantages of the system. 0 9 The court ordered that, if the
operation were to be resumed, both members and nonmembers desiring to partici-
104 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904).
1o See generally Brown, "The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Fade Tort
Principle," 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 563 (1959); Forkosch, "An Analysis of the Prima Fade Tort'
Cause of Action," 42 Cornell L.Q. 465 (1957); Hale, "Prima Fade Torts, Combination, and
Non-Feasance," 46 Colum. L. Rev. 196 (1946); Developments in the Law, "Judicial Control
of Actions of Private Associations," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 1005, 1041 (1963); Note, 52
Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1952).
106 E.g., Fitt v. Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 504, 196 A.2d 26, 30
(Law Div. 1963). "The ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of policy
of rather a delicate nature concerning the merit of the particular benefit to themselves
intended by the defendants .... " Holmes, 'Privilege, Malice, and Intent," 8 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 8 (1894).
107 Masoni v. Board of Trade, 119 Cal. App. 2d 738, 742, 260 P.2d 205, 208 (1953).
108 Developments in the Law, supra note 105, at 1041.
109 See text accompanying note 10 supra. It is interesting to note that the NAREB bad
cited the mandatory participation requirement as a vulnerable area of defendant Board's
system; see text accompanying note 6 supra.
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pate in multiple listing must comply with Board regulations requiring all property
listings obtained by them, with specified exceptions, to be multiple listed."0 The
court thus authorizes the continued use of this regulation and includes non-
members within its purview.
A possible justification for the court's approach might be found in a desire to
maintain the efficiency of the multiple listing system by forced participation.",
Yet, arguably, the public interest in competition demands a different approach.
Sellers who desire an exclusive listing arrangement, and whose property does not
come within a category exempted from mandatory participation in multiple
listing, will be prejudiced by the continued use of the regulation. Under continued
mandatory participation, both member and nonmember brokers will have to
choose between (1) offering a multiple listing arrangement, thus accepting man-
datory participation with no discretion to serve the above-mentioned sellers on an
exclusive basis, or (2) serving all sellers on an exclusive listing basis, thus
securing no benefits from multiple listing. A preferable solution would be to
enjoin mandatory participation in multiple listing and allow members and non-
members alike to secure exclusive listings if such be the seller's selection. Since
the court is making provision for the resumption of multiple listing in order that
the benefit to the public not be lost altogether, it could require that any regulation
detracting from that benefit be modified or deleted.
(2) Damages. In addition to injunctive relief, compensatory damages are
recoverable under all the theories reviewed above. As pointed out in Grillo,
though the measure of damages be uncertain, the right of recovery is not pre-
cluded.112 Relevant evidence which may be adduced to determine damages
includes: (1) annual multiple listing income of defendant boards; (2) commis-
sion fee applied; (3) board regulations concerning division of comnmissions; (4)
number of board members; and (5) average net profit realized by brokers on
gross commissions earned.
Certain assumptions must be made by a court in utilizing the evidence to as-
certain plaintiff's damages. In Grillo the assumption was made that the appropri-
ate measure of probable sale losses which should be attributed to plaintiff was the
average of the multiple-listing sales of all the member brokers. This measure was
chosen despite evidence introduced by plaintiff showing that by far the greatest
proportion of multiple-listing sales were made by three-fifths of the members,
representing those who had concentrated on the use of multiple listing." 3 Plain-
tiff had argued that the sales level attained by the brokers in this group should
be attributed to him, on the assumption that he could have done as well as they
did. Another court might be willing to accept such a contention, and the damages
awarded would accordingly be increased.
:10 GriUo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 229, 219 A.2d 635, 650 (Ch. Div. 1966).
The rules of defendant Board provide that a member is given discretion to choose between
a multiple listing and an exclusive one only if the property involved is a real estate develop-
ment consisting of five or more individual dwelling units, a single structure containing five
or more dwelling units, or a commercial, industrial, or "management" property. No properties
other than these exceptions could be exclusively listed without permission. Id. at 209, 219
A.2d at 639.
111 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
112 Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra note 110, at 230, 219 A.2d at 651.
113 See Brief and Summation for Plaintiff, pp. 26-31, Grillo v. Board of Realtors, supra
note 110.
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A more basic assumption appears necessary with regard to allowance or dis-
allowance of recovery for "listing" commissions.114 In Grillo the assumption was
made, without discussion, that no allowance should be made for the portion of
commissions allocated to the listing member.115 Arguably, under the rules of
defendant Board, such a recovery would not reflect plaintiff's true loss. Board
members, subjected to mandatory participation in multiple listing, could not
accept exclusive listings except on certain exempted properties. 116 On the other
hand, plaintiff's main source of income was from exclusive listings in which he
did not compete with defendants on equal footing but rather had a corner on the
market. Indeed, plaintiff had enjoyed considerable success in the brokerage busi-
ness even during those years in which he was forced to compete with defendants.
To allow plaintiff to keep the profits realized through exclusive listings, and at the
same time recover for losses resulting from failure to receive a listing commission
on the self-same property, might therefore amount to a double recovery.117
A counter-argument might be advanced that by excluding listing commissions
from recoverable damages plaintiff is prejudiced. Since plaintiff was not responsi-
ble for the fact that he was excluded and was thus able to obtain exclusive list-
ings, the latter circumstance should not be considered in estimating damages.
Furthermore, evidence was introduced in Grillo showing that earnings from
multiple-listing sales amounted to only about half of the total earnings of mem-
bers, much of the remainder being realized on exempted property. There is no
reason to assume that plaintiff's earnings for the period in question were not also
substantially from sources exempted from mandatory multiple listing, thus greatly
removing the inequity of allowing him to keep those earnings and also recover
for listing commissions. In addition, plaintiff would have had more properties
available for possible listing if he had been offering a multiple listing arrange-
ment. By limiting any recovery for listing commissions to the difference between
the twenty per cent listing commission on the additional properties which it is
assumed plaintiff would have had, and the net profit realized by plaintiff from
the exclusive listings which he obtained on that half of the properties which would
otherwise have had to be multiple listed, a double recovery can be avoided.118 It
114 See note 9 supra.
115 Absent such an assumption, the court's failure to include any such amount in the
computation of damages would have to be attributed to a "studied inadvertence," since
plaintiff had offered evidence in support of recovery of listing commissions.
116 See note 110 supra.
117 Had plaintiff listed properties with the Board, thus becoming entitled to a 20% listing-
broker share of the commission, he would have lost the opportunity of an exclusive listing
with the realization of 100% of the commission on a consummated sale. But see counter-
argument accompanying note 118 infra.
118 It is not unrealistic that the 20% listing commission on additional properties would
exceed the profits from that half of plaintiff's actual sales. It was found by the court in
Grillo that brokers' net profit on gross commissions received approximated 20-30%, the
remainder going to pay overhead, particularly commissions for salesmen. But if additional
properties obtained by plaintiff were multiple listed, it is conceivable that few of these costs
would be incurred. Plaintiff could list the property with the board and make no further
sales efforts, merely waiting to receive the listing-broker's share in the event a sale is
consummated. A double recovery could thus be avoided by calculating damages as the differ-
ence between a 20% listing commission share on additional properties and 20-30% of the
commissions received on half of plaintiff's sales, rather than deducting 100% of the latter.
Algebraically, the proposed computation would appear as follows: Y = additional properties
available for listing purposes; X = plaintiff's actual sales while competing with defendants;
R = recovery to be allowed for lost listing commissions. R = 20% Y - 307 (3/2 X).
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